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ENFORCEABILITY OF PRECONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS
IN ILLINOIS: THE NEED FOR A MIDDLE GROUND*
MARK K. JOHNSON**

INTRODUCTION

A common pattern exists in commercial life in Illinois: two parties
agree on the general terms of a transaction, and one or both execute a
precontractual agreement detailing the settled terms, while anticipating
further negotiations.' At this point, many business persons consider
themselves "bound," if not legally, at least morally or ethically. 2 Often3
the parties contemplate future execution of a formal contract document.
Frequently, however, the further negotiations stall and one party decides
not to conclude the transaction. The disappointed party then sues, seek4
ing legal enforcement of the precontractual agreement.
Precontractual agreements 5 used in this context have many names:
e.g., "letters of intent," "agreements in principle," "memoranda of intent," and "agreements to agree."'6 Some Illinois courts have noted that
the title of the agreement implies a preliminary as opposed to final agreement. 7 Business persons also infer non-enforceability from such titles,
Copyright 01993 by Mark K. Johnson.
Editor-in-Chief, Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol. 68. I wish to thank Professor Jonathan P.
*
Tomes whose guidance and friendship made the opportunity to write this Note possible. I also wish
to thank Professor Frederick M. Abbott for the initial inspiration of this topic and for his helpful
comments, and Steve Sher for his thorough editing. And I wish to thank Barbara, Patrick, and
Maggie for their love and encouragement.
1. Empro Mfg. Co. v. Ball-Co Mfg., Inc., 870 F.2d 423, 424 (7th Cir. 1989).
2. Charles L. Knapp, Enforcingthe Contractto Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 673, 679 (1969).
Professor Knapp defines "bound" in the sense of what business persons consider good business ethics, rather than strictly legal enforceability.
3. See Knapp, supra note 2, at 682-84. The parties in a "formal contract contemplated" situation usually have differing notions on whether they are in any way "bound" before the execution of
the formal document.
4. See A/S Apothekernes Laboratorium v. I.M.C. Chem. Group, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 193, 195
(N.D. I1. 1988) (discussing typical scenario of litigation in Illinois when question arises as to
whether binding contract exists), aff'd, 873 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1989).
5. The term "precontractual agreement" is somewhat of a misnomer, as it infers a preliminary
stage of negotiation before contracting, which would thus be non-binding. This Note uses the term
for any of the various types of agreements used by parties before execution of a final formal written
contract. In this sense, precontractual agreements may or may not be binding depending on the
myriad factors discussed herein.
6. See generally RALPH B. LAKE & UGO DRAETTA, LETTERS OF INTENT AND OTHER
PRECONTRACTUAL DOCUMENTS 6, 7 (1990). Lake & Draetta define a "Letter of Intent" as a
"precontractual written instrument that reflects preliminary agreements or understandings of one or
more parties to a contract." Id. at 5.
7. Id. at 7, n.17 (citing Chicago Inv. Corp. v. Dolins, 481 N.E.2d 712 (Il. 1985) (court stated
939
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desiring to unilaterally bind the other party while retaining complete
freedom for themselves to withdraw from the precontractual agreement
with impunity.8 The commercial reality of modem business often dictates
even
form
plies

that transactions go forward in these imperfect contractual settings,
if the parties must make substantial expenditures or partially perbefore formal contract execution.9 Consequently, when a court apthe traditional "all or nothing" logic to a disputed precontractual

agreement, uncertainty regarding enforceability can then produce an inequitable result.
Prominent contract law commentators have strongly urged courts
to recognize the enforceability of precontractual agreements.10 Professor
Charles Knapp advocates enforcement of certain agreements called
"contracts to bargain," which occur in the intermediate stage of contract
formation between preliminary negotiations and final contract execution.1 Professor E. Allan Farnsworth (Co-Reporter for the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts and author of a leading contract law treatise) also
advocates judicial recognition of intermediate regimes, which he claims
already exist in contract law. 12 Farnsworth disdains Knapp's idea that a
"contract to bargain" is needed as a separately enforceable entity. 13 Instead, Farnsworth suggests that courts first recognize the intermediate
regimes and then decide the enforceability of each particular precontractual agreement by imaginatively applying traditional contract principles. 1 4 In any event, both commentators call upon courts to abandon the
rigid "all or nothing" approach to contract adjudication, and to adopt a
more flexible theory of precontractual liability based on an obligation of
that "letter of intent" title of document suggests preliminary negotiations as opposed to final contract)). But see Harris v. American Gen. Fin. Corp., 368 N.E.2d 1099, 1103 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)
(court stated that the legal effect of a document is not determined by its label). To avoid this distinction, this Note uses "precontractual agreement" to refer to an instrument executed by the parties
during the "twilight zone" between preliminary negotiation and formal written contract.
8. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
10. See generallyA.M. Dugdale & N.V. Lowe, Contractsto Bargainand Contractsto Negotiate,
1976 J. Bus. L. 28; Knapp, supranote2; Harvey L. Temkin, When Does the "FatLady" Sing? An
Analysis of "Agreements in Principle" in CorporateAcquisitions, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 125 (1986).
But see Wendell H. Holmes, The Freedom Not to Contract,60 TUL. L. REv. 751 (1986) (advocating
preservation of bargainers' freedom from the binding effect of precontractbal agreements until a
relationship develops or performance commences).
11. See generally Knapp, supra note 2. Professor Knapp was one of the first to introduce this
"middle ground" concept, and many commentators have cited Knapp in further developing the
"contract to bargain" theme. See, eg., E. Allan Farnsworth, PrecontractualLiability and Preliminary Agreemen" FairDealing and FailedNegotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 217, 218 n.2, 267 n.209
(1987); Temkin, supra note 10, at 127 n.10.
12. See generally Farnsworth, supra note 11. See also infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
13. Id. at 220.
14. Id
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good faith in the negotiating process. 15
In Part I, this Note traces the background of the traditional "all or
nothing" contract doctrine as it applies to precontractual agreements and
discusses the application of various more flexible theories, including the
obligation to negotiate in good faith. 16 The Illinois courts have not enthusiastically embraced these alternative theories, although the current
trend in other jurisdictions is to enforce precontractual agreements in
certain limited factual situations.1 7 Generally, enforceability turns on
whether the parties intended to be bound by the agreement.18 Following
established contract doctrine, determination of intent is an objective exercise. 19 Some jurisdictions have adopted a set of "factors" to assist in
determining the parties' intent.20 In Part II, this Note examines the factors that Illinois courts consider relevant to the enforceability of precontractual agreements, 21 and canvasses how courts applying Illinois law
have dealt with the obligation of good faith in negotiation.2
The basic business purpose of a precontractual agreement is to record any terms that the parties have agreed upon and to provide a framework for further negotiations. 23 Other uses include obtaining
financing, 24 inducing subcontractors to commit, 25 and obtaining regulatory agency approval of a transaction.2 6 The precontractual agreement is
a useful device in the business arena, but courts and commentators disagree whether legal enforcement of these agreements will aid or hinder
business transactions. 27 Business persons also disagree, believing that
legal system participation in negotiations is unnecessary and that economic reasons make honoring promises essential in most business con15. See also Temkin, supra note 10, at 141-61.
16. See infra notes 31-102 and accompanying text.
17. See Temkin, supra note 10, at 153.
18. See LAKE & DRArA, supra note 6, at 30-32. For the Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation of intent to be bound, see Quake Constr. Co. v. American Airlines, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 990 (Il1.
1990) (discussed infra at notes 161-205 and accompanying text).
19. Id.
20. See infra notes 39, 40 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 103-60 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 146.48 and accompanying text.
23. LAKE & DRArA, supra note 6, at 11.
24. See, eg., Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
25. See, eg., Quake Constr., Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 990 (Ill. 1990) (discussed infra at notes 161-205 and accompanying text).
26. See, eg., Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., 727 F.2d 257 (2d Cir.), cer. denied, 469 U.S.
828 (1984). SCM's 10-K report, filed with the SEC, referred to the sale of a corporate division to
Reprosystem via an "agreement in principle," but also stated that SCM made "no assurance that the
transaction would be completed." 727 F.2d at 260.
27. See infra notes 206-39 and accompanying text.
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texts. 28 In Part III, this Note discusses the possible business
consequences of legal enforcement of precontractual agreements, 29 and
makes recommendations for drafting precontractual agreements under
Illinois law depending upon the desired binding effect. 30 In Part IV, the
Note concludes by recommending that the Illinois courts accept an intermediate, flexible regime of enforceable precontractual agreements, which
will better reflect the actual intentions of business users of such
agreements.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

TraditionalContract Law

Most courts decide precontractual agreement litigation on traditional contract law principles. 3 ' Under the traditional "all or nothing"
approach, courts determine whether a precontractual agreement is a
binding contract by first deciding whether the parties intended to be
bound. 32 Next, the courts search for definite terms, enforcing precon33
tractual agreements only when sufficiently definite terms are present.
Sometimes principles of consideration affect enforcement. 34 In most
cases, however, courts using the "all or nothing" approach strive to find
a contract when the parties evidence intent to be bound by a precontrac28. LAKE & DRAETTA, supra note 6, at 11 n.29 (citing Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in
Businesw A PreliminaryStudy, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 63 (1963)).
29. See infra notes 240-47 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 248-76 and accompanying text.
31. Temkin, supra note 10, at 131.
32. Id Courts and commentators interpret the many "intent factors" differently. See, eg.,
Borg-Warner Corp. v. Anchor Coupling Co., 156 N.E.2d 513 (111.1958) (discussed infra at notes
103-09 and accompanying text); see also Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 257, 273 (future contract
contemplated usually indicates no intent to be bound). But see LAKE & DRAETTA, supra note 6, at
93 (presence of all essential terms might indicate intent to be bound, even when parties contemplate
future formal contract).
33. See LAKE & DRAETrA, supra note 6, at 90-93 (collecting cases indicating that completeness
of terms in the precontractual agreement may be the most important factor in enforceability decisions). But see Pearson Bros. Co. v. Pearson, 113 B.R. 469, 476-77 (Bankr. C.D. Il1. 1990) (district
court refused to enforce "agreement to agree," which bankruptcy magistrate found complete as to
essential terms, because the agreement was still too indefinite for the court to fashion a remedy). Cf.
U.C.C. § 2-305 cmt. I (rejecting in sales transactions the notion that "an agreement to agree is
unenforceable" for "indefiniteness" because it includes an open price term; instead recognizing that
the dominant intention of the parties to be bound to the deal prevails).
34. See, eg.. Channel Home Ctrs. v. Grossman, 795 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding consideration in contract to negotiate shopping mall store lease in good faith was provided by-"value" of letter
of intent: tenant conferred value in exchange for mall owner's promise to negotiate in good faith;
mall owner used letter of intent to obtain financing for mall); see also LAKE & DRATTA, supra note
6, at 36-37 (general consideration discussion); Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 246 (describing how
inclusion of too many conditions precedent in preliminary agreements may make the ultimate agreement illusory and thus unenforceable); Temkin, supra note 10, at 154-55 (negotiating parties' "withdrawal from market" provides consideration in corporate acquisition "agreements in principle").
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tual agreement. 35 Similarly, courts are loath to enforce precontractual

agreements when binding intent is not absolutely certain. 36

Under traditional contract principles, the parties must objectively
manifest their intent to be bound. 37 Subjective intent by one party to
bind the other is insufficient to form a contract. 38 "All or nothing"
courts have developed objective factors to aid in assessing the parties'
objective intent. 39 Some of the factors are: express statements reserving
binding effect until execution of subsequent contract; any partial performance; agreement on all essential terms; and the complexity of the
underlying transaction. 40 Frequently courts frame the issue in terms of
ambiguity, 4 1 focusing on the express language of the precontractual
agreement. 42 Under this approach, courts confine themselves to the
"four-corners" of the document and prohibit any extrinsic evidence relating to interpretation. 4 3 Other courts look to the surrounding circumstances and conduct of the parties for manifestations of intent." Some
35. Temkin, supra note 10, at 131. Temkin also says that when courts are convinced that the
parties intended to be bound by a precontractual agreement, they will read enough terms into the
agreement to overcome any completeness problem, if a basis for remedy exists. Md
36. LAKE & DRAETTA, supra note 6, at 35. See, eg., Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n v. Tribune
Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that courts' primary concern is not to trap
parties into "surprise" binding agreements).
37. See generally LAKE & DRAEirA, supra note 6, at 38-41. But see 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CoNrRAcrs § 106 (2d ed. 1963). Cf R ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19
(1981) [hereinafter REsTATEMENT]. For a discussion of subjective intent by Judge Easterbrook, see
Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 815 (7th Cir. 1987). See also infra notes 209-12.
38. Skycom, 813 F.2d at 815.
39. See, e.g., R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying
factors in corporate franchise agreement setting). Accord Winston v. MediaFare Entertainment
Corp., 777 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1985); Teachers v. Tribune, 670 F. Supp. at 491 (complete analysis of
enforceability of financing agreement using factors).
40. LAKE & DRAETrA, supra note 6, at 90 n.24. For factors used by courts interpreting Illinois
law, see Chicago Inv. Corp. v. Dolins, 481 N.E.2d 712 (111. 1985); see also Ceres Illinois, Inc. v.
Illinois Scrap Processing, Inc., 500 N.E.2d 1 (Ill.
1986) (discussed infra at notes 137-41 and accompanying text).
41. See, e.g., Interway, Inc. v. Alagna, 407 N.E.2d 615 (IIl. App. Ct. 1980) (letter of intent
language not ambiguous, therefore trial court dismissal proper). Cf.Quake Constr., Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 990 (111. 1990) (letter of intent language ambiguous, therefore trial

court dismissal improper).
42. In Interway, 407 N.E.2d at 620, the express language said "we have agreed," but also said
"subject to a definitive... contract." In Quake, 565 N.E.2d at 996, the language said "[w]e have
elected to award," but also said "reserves the right to cancel;" see also infra notes 161-96 and accompanying text.
43. See, eg., Rakowski v. Lucente, 472 N.E.2d 791 (Ill.
1984); see also infra notes 151-60 and
accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Itek Corp. v. Chicago Aerial Indus., Inc., 248 A.2d 625, 629 (Del. 1968) (citing
Borg-Warner Corp. v. Anchor Coupling, Inc., 156 N.E.2d 513 (Ill.
1958), as authority that the trier
of fact "of necessity" must look at the surrounding circumstances and conduct of the negotiating
parties to determine whether an enforceable agreement exists). For a discussion of Borg-Warner,see
infra notes 103-09 and accompanying text. Farnsworth says any court inquiry into fair dealing is
incomplete unless the court looks at the surrounding circumstances to determine the parties' expectations. Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 272.
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commentators consider partial performance by either party as the strongest indicator of an intent to be bound. 45
The contract law commentators argue that courts viewing precontractual agreements in the traditional "all or nothing" approach confine
themselves to artificial "pigeon holes" to decide enforceability. 4 6 Illinois
courts have steadfastly retained the "all or nothing" approach in contract cases, particularly in precontractual agreement cases. 47 Thus confined, Illinois courts must strain to find "contract" or "no contract,"
when justice instead would mandate an intermediate finding.48 Contract
law in Illinois, therefore, needs an intermediate position to more fairly
decide enforceability of precontractual agreements. This intermediate
position is called the "contract to bargain."
B.

The "Contract to Bargain"

Several contract law commentators advocate variations of the "contract to bargain" as the needed intermediate position. 49 Courts enforcing
a "contract to bargain" would legally recognize what many business persons already feel-that precontractual agreements are morally or ethically binding. 50 Enforcement of "contracts to bargain" would lend
predictability to an otherwise unstable area of contract law and would
provide remedies for disappointed parties wronged during incomplete
transactions. 5 '
As in traditional contract law, the objective intent of the parties is
paramount when the binding effect of a "contract to bargain" is ques45. See, eg., Frank Horton & Co. v. Cook Elec. Co., 356 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 952 (1966) (court found that letter of intent was binding even though parties contemplated
later contract because letter contained all essential terms and the party seeking enforcement had
commenced performance); Holmes, supra note 10, at 782 (stating that partial performance supplants
even expressed intent); see generally LAKE & DRAETTA, supra note 6, at 103-12. But see Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 273 (behavior of parties and state of negotiations at time of breach are most
important surrounding circumstances).
46. See eg., Knapp, supra note 2, at 677. Courts define precontractual agreements as "agreement to agree' or "formal contract contemplated" cases, to avoid the polar extremes of "mere negotiation" or "complete contract."
47. See infra notes 103-42 and accompanying text.
48. See Knapp, supra note 2, at 715 (criticizingBorgWarner,156 N.E.2d 513, as an example of
judicial fiction required when a judge is concerned with justice for the parties but must use structured "all or nothing" contractual analysis to decide enforceability of a precontractual agreement).
49. See generally Dugdale & Lowe, supra note 10 ("contract to negotiate"); Farnsworth, supra
note 11 ("agreement to negotiate" and "agreement with open terms"); Knapp, supra note 2 ("contract to bargain"); Temkin, supra note 10 ("agreement in principle").
50. Knapp, supra note 2,at 679-84 (discussing the extent business persons consider themselves
"bound" in various precontractual settings).
51. Knapp, supra note 2, at 726-28. See also Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 259-60 (stating that
no area of contract law is less predictable).
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tioned. 52 If the parties have clearly manifested such an intent, courts

should not ignore it just because the precontractual agreement falls into a
traditionally unenforceable "pigeon hole." 53 Conversely, courts should
also honor the expectations of both parties clearly not intending to be
bound by a precontractual agreement, even if the agreement is otherwise
contractually complete. 54 In Illinois precontractual agreements, the intent of the parties is controlling, 55 yet Illinois courts have not recognized
enforcement of "contracts to bargain" as a method to effectuate this intent. Judicial recognition of "contracts to bargain" would allow courts
56
to more narrowly tailor their decisions to the parties' true intent.
In his very thorough treatment of precontractual liability, Professor
Farnsworth expands this idea to four regimes: the initial polar regime of
"negotiation" (unenforceable); the intermediate regimes of "agreement to
negotiate" and "agreement with open terms" (sometimes enforceable);
and the opposite polar regime of "ultimate agreement" (always enforceable). 57 A separately recognized "contract to bargain" is thus superfluous,
because courts can readily recognize the parties true intent by enforcing
precontractual agreements under these regimes within the traditional
contract law sphere. 58 Farnsworth's "agreements with open terms" and
"agreements to negotiate" impose a duty of fair dealing between the parties. 59 The next hurdle for courts considering enforceability of precontractual agreements is to define this duty, also called the obligation to
negotiate in "good faith." 6
C. The "Good Faith" Doctrine
All contracts carry an implicit obligation of good faith performance. 61 This obligation currently may not extend to parties in precon52. See generally LAKE & DRAErrA, supra note 6, at 38-41; Temkin, supra note 10, at 132-33.
53. Temkin, supra note 10, at 135.
54. Id.
55. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
56. Temkin, supra note 10, at 142.
57. See Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 220.
58. Id.
59. See generally id. The difference is that the "agreement with open terms" imposes the duty
of fair dealing only with regard to the negotiation of the open terms, whereas the "agreement to
negotiate" imposes a general duty of fair dealing with regard to the entire negotiation regime. Id. at
263.
60. See. eg. Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in GeneralContract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195 (1968).
61. Compare RSrATEMENT, supra note 37, § 205 ("Every contract imposes upon each party a
*duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.") with U.C.C. § 1-203
(1978) ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.").
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tractual negotiations. 62 Some courts have confused the obligations of
good faith in negotiation with "best efforts" in performance. 63 Difficulty
in defining "good faith" has prevented courts from enforcing a precontractual obligation to negotiate in good faith.64
Good faith in contractual relations is thus a fertile topic for commentators. 6 5 Professor Robert Summers defines good faith as an "excluder," ruling out various forms of bad faith conduct. 66 Others oppose
recognition of any such inchoate obligations. 67 But Professor Knapp argues that recognition of "contracts to bargain" would enable courts to
consider bad faith as breaching conduct, 68 allowing them to concentrate
instead on the critical good faith question: "Why did the [recalcitrant
party] refuse to go though with the [deal]?" 69 Traditional "all or nothing" principles constrict the courts to two extremes: finding a complete
contract where the parties intended only a "contract to bargain;" or finding no contract at all and ignoring any bad faith conduct by the breach0
ing party.
Some case law examples from other jurisdictions illustrate these extremes. The decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in Itek Corp. v.
Chicago Aerial Industries, InC.71 is an early application of Illinois law
recognizing the precontractual obligation to negotiate in good faith. The
principal stockholders of Chicago Aerial Industries ("CAI") negotiated
for the sale of their controlling stock to Itek Corp., while concurrently
enticing a third party to reopen bidding for the same stock. When the
62. See Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 269 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 205 cmt. c (1981), which notes that its "section on 'good faith,' like the comparable section of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 'does not deal with good faith in the formation of a contract' "). But see

LAKE & DRAETTA, supra note 6, at 159 (stating that RESTATEMENT § 205 cmt. c, supra, may
permit actions based on bad faith in negotiation).
63. See eg., LAKE & DRAETrA, supra note 6, at 160 n.39 (citing Channel Home Ctrs. v.
Grossman, 795 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1986)).
64. See, eg., Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., 727 F.2d 257 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 469 U.S.
828 (1984) (discussed infra at notes 76-81 and accompanying text); see also Feldman v. Allegheny
Int'l, Inc., 850 F.2d 1217, 1223 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that disagreement between parties is not "bad
faith"). Farnsworth, however, disagrees that courts can't define fair dealing in negotiation. Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 268.
65. See generally LAKE & DRAETTA, supra note 6, at 123-25, 158-71; Farnsworth, supra note
11, at 268-86; Summers, supra note 60, at 195; Temkin, supra note 10, at 141-61.
66. Summers, supra note 60, at 232-43.
67. See generally Andrew R. Klein, Comment, Devil'sAdvocate: Salvaging the Letter of Intent,
37 EMORY LJ.139 (1988) (recommending that letters of intent be non-binding in corporate acquisition settings and not impose an ill-defined obligation to negotiate in good faith). See also id. at 14849 (criticizing Temkin's recommendation that courts should impose a duty of good faith in negotiation of corporate acquisitions).
68. Knapp, supra note 2, at 727.
69. Id at 716 (discussing Borg-Warner, 156 N.E.2d 513).
70. Id. at 727.
71. 248 A.2d 625 (Del. 1968).
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third party bid higher, CAI terminated negotiations with Itek, even
though Itek agreed to all the additional terms proposed by CAI, including price adjustments and other concessions. 72 The Delaware Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's summary judgment for CA173 and remanded the case to the trial court with directions to consider whether
defendant had acted in bad faith.74 Although decided in Delaware, Itek
held that under Illinois law parties could obligate themselves to negotiate
75
in good faith toward a formal agreement.

The opinion of the federal district court in Reprosystem, B. V v.
SCM Corp.76 contains an extensive discussion of the obligation to negotiate in good faith.77 Reprosystem concerned failed negotiations for the
purchase of SCM's European copier business. After lengthy negotiations
which culminated in an "agreement in principle," the deal fell through.
One of the provisions of the purchase was that SCM operate the European subsidiary in Reprosystems' behalf after the parties had agreed to
the basic transaction, but while the final contract was being negotiated.
In the interim, SCM changed management teams. When the new management discovered that the subsidiaries were more profitable than SCM

previously realized, SCM backed out of the deal. Reprosystem sued for
enforcement of the "agreement in principle," alleging breach of contract,
promissory estoppel, and failure to negotiate in good faith. 78 The district
court found for Reprosystem based on SCM's breach of the duty to negotiate in good faith.79 The Second Circuit reversed,80 however, recognizing that a duty to negotiate in good faith existed, but concluding that
under New York law the duty was too indefinite to enforce.8 1
72. Id,at 628.
73. Id at 630. The court held that language of the precontractual agreement such as "we have
agreed to work towards .... ," "reasonable efforts to agree upon and prepare contract," and "parties
under no further obligation" created an issue of fact precluding summary judgment. Id at 629.
74. Id The court directed the trial court to examine entire circumstances of negotiations and
conduct of principles to determine if an enforceable precontractual agreement existed.
75. Interestingly, despite the widespread judicial and commentary citation of Itek to support
this Illinois law "good faith" principle (see, eg.. Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 265 (calling Itek "the
leading example")), on remand the trial court found that the parties had not entered an enforceable
agreement. Itek Corp. v. Chicago Aerial Indus., Inc., 274 A.2d 141 (1971).
76. 522 F. Supp. 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd in part rev'd in part,727 F.2d 257 (2d Cir.), cert

denied, 469 U.S. 828 (1984).
77. Temkin, supra note 10, at 149.
78. See generally id.
at 149-53.
79. Reprosystem, 522 F. Supp. at 1257.
80. Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., 727 F.2d 257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 828 (1984).
81. 727 F.2d at 264. The court also concluded that no enforceable contract existed between the
parties, and thus no implied obligation to negotiate in good faith could arise. Temkin suggests that
the court reverted to the traditional "all or nothing" approach, thus precluding the good faith issue.
Temkin, supra note 10, at 152.
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More recently, in Channel Home Centers v. Grossman, 2 the Third
Circuit held that under Pennsylvania law a letter of intent created a mutually enforceable agreement obligating the parties to negotiate in good
faith.8 3 In ChannelHome, a shopping mall owner and major tenant disputed a precontractual agreement. The parties executed the agreement
to reserve mall space for the tenant during formal lease negotiation. The
tenant alleged that the agreement bound the parties to negotiate in good
faith, and that the mall owner had breached the agreement by terminating negotiations with the tenant and then entering into a lease agreement
with another party.84 The Third Circuit remanded, directing the trial
court to consider whether the owner acted in bad faith. 5 One commentator considers the Channel Home decision significant because it recognized the enforceability of the "contract to bargain" apart from the
actual transaction that the parties were negotiating.8 6
The Itek Reprosystem, and ChannelHome cases show the different
approaches that the courts outside Illinois have taken when faced with
bad faith issues in precontractual negotiating. Three approaches used by
the courts are summarized as follows: 8 7 (1) the court could find that an
unjustified withdrawal is a breach of the duty to negotiate in good faith,
irrespective of finding an enforceable contract to complete the ultimate
transaction;88 (2) the court could find that a separate duty to negotiate in
good faith exists, but consider the duty too indefinite to enforce;89 or (3)
the court could revert to the "all or nothing" approach, even while acknowledging the duty of good faith. 90 The courts applying Illinois law
since Itek have been slow to adopt this obligation of good faith, usually
reverting to the "all or nothing" approach. 91 By ignoring fair dealing in
the intermediate regimes, the Illinois courts also ignore the harder questions of what constitutes a breach of good faith and how to apportion
damages for such a breach. The last obstacle confronting courts that
otherwise might enforce precontractual agreements is fashioning reme82. 795 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1986).
83. Id. at 299.
84. Id. at 296.
85. Id at 300.

86. LAKE & DRAETrA, supra note 6, at 164. Lake and Draetta also note that the Channel
Home court used the "all or nothing" contract factors to require that the contract to bargain must be
a complete contractual agreement. But the court did not require that the contract to bargain must
be complete with respect to the desired ultimate transaction. Id at 163.
87. See Temkin, supra note 10, at 148-49.
88. Eg., Itek, 248 A.2d at 629; Channel Home, 795 F.2d at 299.
89. Eg., Reprosystem, 727 F.2d at 264.
90. See, e-g., supra note 81.
91. See infra notes 116-42 and accompanying text.

19931

PRECONTRACTUAL

AGREEMENTS IN ILLINOIS

dies when the agreements are breached. 92
D.

Remedies

Courts struggling with the remedy question for breaches of precontractual agreements have not yet agreed on the appropriate measure of
recovery. 93 Various contract law commentators have advocated reliance
damages, 94 expectation damages, 95 restitution, 96 unjust enrichment, and
even specific performance. 97 One court awarded full expectation damages in a case involving actual work performed under a breached precontractual agreement. 98 But most parties may have to forego expectation
92. Temkin, supra note 10, at 153.
93. See id. at 161. Temkin explains that because breach of a duty to negotiate in good faith is a
fairly recent legal development, the case law of remedies for such breaches has been slow to develop.
Also, most reported cases involving precontractual agreements are appeals of trial court dismissals.
When the appellate court holds that a cause of action exists and remands, the parties often settle out
of court. This trend prevents establishment of any conclusive precedent illustrating judicial remedies
for breach of precontractual agreements. Id
94. Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 264. In an "agreement to negotiate" setting, the court cannot
tell what ultimate agreement the parties would have negotiated, thus expectation damages are inappropriate. Farnsworth explains that parties generally enter "agreements to negotiate" to protect
their reliance interests in the event one party withdraws. This strengthens the argument that reliance damages for breach of a precontractual agreement should include "lost opportunities," as opposed to the expectation element of lost profit from the never-defined ultimate agreement. Id
95. Id. at 255. In an "agreement with open terms" the court can fashion a definite expectation
remedy, because the essential terms of the ultimate agreement are present. Id. Thus, expectation
damages may be an appropriate remedy for an "agreement with open terms," but not appropriate for
other precontractual agreements that do not include the essential terms of the ultimate agreement.
See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
96. See generally S.N. Ball, Work Carried Out in Pursuanceof Letters of Intent-Contractor
Restitution?, 99 LAW Q. REv. 572 (1983). Ball actually prefers a flexible remedy between the
"black" of contract and the "white" of restitution, especially in cases where work has been performed under a precontractual agreement. Id. at 587. This flexibility would more accurately reflect
the commercial expectations of the parties. Reliance damages in contract heavily favor the breaching party by preventing any expectation damages, and restitution unfairly favors the performing
party by denying the breaching party any protection of the terms of the putative agreement. See id
at 582-90.
97. See Knapp, supra note 2, at 724-25. A court might award damages in unjust enrichment
when a defendant has breached a contract to bargain for the sale of an asset which it then sells to a
third party. The plaintiff may be entitled to the defendant's unjust profits from the third party sale.
Id. at 724. Specific performance of a contract to bargain is usually not appropriate, but if the material terms of the ultimate agreement are in place, a court could decree specific performance. Id at
725.
98. Frank Horton & Co. v. Cook Elec. Co., 356 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1965), cerL denied,384. U.S.
952 (1966). In Horton, bad faith clearly was a factor. In a letter of intent, the defendant directed the
plaintiff to prepare for performance by moving equipment to the jobsite at substantial cost, while
concurrently negotiating with a third party for the same work. The defendant ultimately terminated
negotiation with the plaintiff, using the plaintiff's delay in signing an agreement with the national
union as an excuse to award the job to the third party. The court found that the letter of intent
formed a contract because it contained all the essential terms and the plaintiff had commenced performance. Id at 490. The court then awarded expectation damages, using the plaintiff's own cost
estimates as a basis for calculating its lost profits. Id at 492.
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damages in order to prevail on a "contract to bargain" action. 99 The
lower court opinion in Reprosystem 100 illustrates the difficulty of assessing damages for breach of a precontractual agreement in a complex, incomplete transaction.10 1 Recognizing enforceability of precontractual
agreements actually should aid courts in determining damages, especially
when the agreement supplies the major "essential" terms.10 2
This background of case law and commentary touches on a few of
the divergent paths that the courts have taken to decide the enforceability of precontractual agreements. Illinois law is firmly rooted in the
traditional "all or nothing" contract doctrine, but other jurisdictions
have adopted more flexible, intermediate approaches. Though the "all or
nothing" approach still dominates, some courts will recognize a "contract to bargain" when appropriate factors are present. The obligation to
negotiate in good faith is making inroads into decisions on precontractual
agreements. Also, courts can apportion damages with specificity when
precontractual agreements are breached. The next section discusses the
development and current status of these areas of Illinois law regarding
enforceability of precontractual agreements.
II.

ILLiNOIS LAW

A. Borg-Warnerand Progeny
The "modem" law of precontractual liability in Illinois originated in
1958 in Borg-Warner Corp. v. Anchor Coupling Co. 10 3 The parties exchanged letters of intent defining the proposed terms of Borg-Warner's
99. See LAKE & DRAETTA, supra note 6, at 164 (discussing Channel Home Ctrs. v. Grossman,
795 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1986)). Full expectation damages are only available if the precontractual
agreement is complete as to the ultimate transaction, not just as a contract to negotiate. Id.
100. Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., 522 F. Supp. 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd inpart,rev'd in
part, 727 F.2d 257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 828 (1984).
101. See Temkin, supra note 10, at 151 nn.1 12-14. The Reprosystem court based its remedy on
restitution and unjust enrichment, a scheme which proved most difficult to implement. The court
also rejected reliance damages and promissory estoppel. The court apparently denied expectation
damages because Reprosystem failed to prove that it could have completed the transaction financially. Id at 151 n.114. But see Pearson Bros. Co. v. Pearson, 113 B.R. 469 (Bankr. C.D. I1. 1990)
(finding that an "agreement to agree" failed for indefiniteness, but nevertheless awarding reliance
damages in promissory estoppel). The Pearson court cited case law examples, and E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.3, at 209 (1982), to support the proposition that reliance damages
are available when a contract fails for indefiniteness. Pearson, 113 B.R. at 479.
Defining reliance damages is also a problem for courts. See, e-g., Empro Mfg. Co. v. Bail-Co
Mfg., Inc., 870 F.2d 423, 426 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that the cost of negotiating, investigating, and
reviewing a target business are normal precontractual expenditures and not "reliance damages"
when the deal falls through).
102. Knapp, supra note 2, at 723-24. See also Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 267 (courts generally require less certainty to prove reliance damages).
103. 156 N.E.2d 513 (I1. 1958).
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corporate acquisition of Anchor. The acquisition was conditional upon a
survey of Anchor's assets and satisfactory arrangements for continued
employment of one of Anchor's directors. Borg-Warner conducted the
survey in reliance on Anchor's letter. After completing the survey, BorgWarner assented to the sale, but one of Anchor's directors balked because the continued employment condition had not been satisfied. BorgWarner then sued for specific performance. The trial court dismissed the
case, however, finding that the parties had not reached a complete
agreement.104
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that
contemplation of a future formal written contract does not preclude enforcement of a preliminary agreement containing the essential material
terms. 10 5 The court also stated that once the parties reach agreement on
the material terms, they are obligated to attempt to settle the remaining
minor details in good faith.10 6 Professor Knapp criticized Borg-Warner
as an example of the judicial fiction of using "all or nothing" reasoning to
decide the enforceability of a precontractual agreement.10 7 Nevertheless,
Borg-Warner established that Illinois courts could enforce a precontractual agreement containing the essential terms of a transaction, notwithstanding "conditions" remaining for future agreement and recitation that
formal written contract execution would follow. 0 8 As always, the
threshold inquiry is the intent of the parties to be bound by the precontractual agreement. 109
Courts dutifully followed Borg-Warner in developing the early Illinois doctrine regarding precontractual liability.110 Many of the important decisions were by courts in other jurisdictions applying Illinois
law."' These courts expanded the doctrine to include situations of partial performance,"1 2 good faith,1 3 and consideration of all relevant sur104. Id at 516.
105. Id. at 518.
106. Id. at 517.
107. See Knapp, supra note 2, at 714-16.
108. See generally Richard F. Zehle, Letters of Intent: The Present State of Illinois Law, ILL
B.J., January 1979, at 286 (tracing development of Illinois "letter of intent" doctrine from BorgWarner through Terracom Dev. Group, Inc. v. Coleman Cable & Wire Co., 365 N.E.2d 1028 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1977) (discussed infra at notes 116-20 and accompanying text)).
109. Borg-Warner, 156 N.E.2d at 516. The actual holding in Borg-Warner was that the parties'
letters were ambiguous as to their intent to be bound, thus the trial court should not have granted
defendant's motion to dismiss because intent is an issue for the trier-of-fact. Id. at 518.
110. See Zehine, supra note 108, at 287.
111. See, eg., Frank Horton & Co. v. Cook Elec. Co., 356 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384. U.S. 952 (1966); Evans, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 416 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Itek Corp. v.
Chicago Aerial Indus., Inc., 248 A.2d 625 (Del. 1968).
112. See, eg., Horton, 356 F.2d 485; see also supra notes 44, 45 and accompanying text.
113. See, eg., Itek, 248 A.2d 625; see also supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
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rounding circumstances to determine the parties' intent to be bound.' 14
Thus, the circumstances of negotiation and conduct of the parties can be
important issues, especially when the precontractual agreement contains
language limiting any binding effect.115
The Illinois Appellate Court narrowed the Borg-Warner doctrine in
Terracom Development Group, Inc. v. Coleman Cable & Wire Co. 1 16 In
Terracom, the court held that a detailed disclaimer in offer/counter-offer
letters for the sale and leaseback of real estate unambiguously indicated
as a matter of law that the parties intended not to be bound until they
executed a formal agreement.117 Terracom and Coleman had exchanged
several modifications of their offer and counter-offer letters. Coleman's
controlling counter-offer contained a disclaimer stating: "This letter of
intent is not binding upon us in any way nor is the conditional offer contained herein binding upon us except to the extent that it reflects our
intent to enter into a definitive written agreement .

.*"1 18 The parties

continued negotiation and eventually agreed on all the essential terms of
the transaction and the satisfaction of the conditions, but never signed
the required definitive agreement. Coleman withdrew and Terracom
sued. The court focused on the unambiguous language of the disclaimer,
even though the parties had agreed upon all the essential terms of the
underlying transaction.11 9 The Terracom decision, although difficult to
reconcile with Borg-Warner, indicated that Illinois courts will honor one
party's express disclaimer of binding intent, despite the presence of other
factors indicating intent to be bound.120
The Illinois Appellate Court further narrowed the Borg-Warner
doctrine in Interway, Inc. v. Alagna. 121 After negotiating for several
months, the parties had executed a precontractual agreement for the sale
of stock by Alagna to Interway. On the next business day, Alagna decided not to proceed with execution of a formal contract. Interway sued
114. See, eg., Evans, 416 F. Supp. at 224; Itek, 248 A.2d at 625.
115. See. e.g., Itek, 248 A.2d at 629 (language of "if parties fail to agree" not a valid disclaimer
when bad faith is involved); see also supra notes 44, 45 and accompanying text.
Recently, courts have placed more weight on such disclaimers, especially if the other "factors"
show ambiguity regarding intent to be bound. See infra notes 121-33 and accompanying text.
116. 365 N.E.2d 1028 (Il1.App. Ct. 1977).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1029-30 (emphasis supplied). The letter also included language about express conditions, mutual satisfaction of counsel, and a deadline for executing the written agreement. Id
119. Id. For a thorough discussion of the Terracom holding, see Zehlne, supra note 108, at 288.
120. See LAKE & DRAETrA, supra note 6, at 98; see also Zehlne, supra note 108, at 289 (categorizing such a precontractual agreement as a "letter of non-intent"). But see Harris v. American Gen.
Fin. Corp., 368 N.E.2d 1099 (Il1. App. Ct. 1977) (finding a binding contract in precontractual agreement which contemplated future drafting of formal documents).
121. 407 N.E.2d 615 (I1. App. Ct. 1980).
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for specific performance, claiming that the parties intended the precontractual agreement to be binding. The court stated that the agreement
was unenforceable as a matter of law because limiting language indicated
that execution of a subsequent contract was a condition precedent to any
binding effect.12 2 The court then affirmed dismissal of the enforcement
action because no factual question existed as to the parties' intent.'2
The court reasoned that the ambiguous language, which indicated both
binding and non-binding intent, conclusively showed that the precontractual agreement was too tentative to be binding. The questionable language included terms such as "subject to," "confirm our agreement," and
"we have agreed."' 24 The court also pointed out that because Alagna
withdrew on the next day after signing the precontractual agreement, no
partial performance factors were present. 25 Thus, the Interway court
established that even vague disclaimers can be effective in negating bind26
ing intent.1
The same court then seemed to relent in Chicago Investment Corp. v.
Dolins.' 2 7 Although citing its decision in Interway, the appellate court
reversed a trial court dismissal and remanded, because similar language
in a letter of intent for a real estate sale was ambiguous as to binding
intent. 128 The letter of intent was complete as to payment terms, mortgage details, and description of the real estate parcels, but included language requiring the final contract to be acceptable to the parties'
attorneys. The letter of intent also referred to future events that would
occur upon execution of the contract. Because the letter of intent was
otherwise complete, the appellate court held that factual issues of intent
were present which precluded trial court dismissal. 29 The court also
stated that the "letter of intent" label on the precontractual agreement
122. Mdat 618 (citations omitted). The precontractual agreement (prepared by Interway) specifically stated: "Our purchase is subject to a definitive Purchase and Sale Contract to be executed by
the parties." IM at 617 (emphasis added). Ironically, the court strictly construed this disclaimer
against Interway-which presumably drafted the disclaimer to protect itself-even though Alagna
then used the disclaimer to back out of the deal.
123. See id.
124. Id. at 620.
125. Id. at 620-21. The court distinguished Interway from Borg-Warner, Itek, and Evans, because in those cases one party had taken substantial action based on having a binding agreement.
Thus "detrimental reliance" was a factor evidencing a binding precontractual agreement. I, at
621.
126. See LAKE & DRAETrA, supra note 6, at 99. This reading ofInterway (that vague disclaimers usually are effective to negate precontractual liability) is no longer so certain in Illinois. See infra

notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
127. 418 N.E.2d 59 (IIl. App. Ct. 1981), rev'd, 481 N.E.2d 712 (II. 1985).
128. See id
129. Id
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was only one element to be considered in judging intent.' 30 The Illinois
Supreme Court reversed the appellate court holding and affirmed the
trial court dismissal, however, reiterating the principle that contemplation of formal contract execution can be a condition precedent precluding enforcement of an otherwise complete precontractual agreement. 1 3 '
The Supreme Court cited the opposite Borg-Warner and Terracom theories before concluding that the specific language referring to formal contract execution in the letter of intent was controlling.1 32 The Interway
and Dolins results seem harsh in view of later decisions, which have remanded for factual determination of intent on less ambiguous
133
language.
Subsequent decisions have applied this "condition precedent doctrine," often while ignoring other strong factors of intent to be bound. In
Ebert v. Dr. Scholl's Foot Comfort Shops,1 34 the Illinois Appellate Court
decided that a putative contract formed by various writings and proposed
leases exchanged by the parties was contravened by "plain language" giving binding effect only "upon the execution and delivery" of the lease.' 35
The Ebert court affirmed summary judgment against finding a contract
because of the condition precedent formed by the plain language. 36 In
Ceres Illinois, Inc. v. Illinois Scrap Processing, Inc., 137 the Illinois
Supreme Court denied enforcement of an oral lease agreement because
the parties made numerous references to a future formal contract during
negotiations. 138 In Ceres, Illinois Scrap set up an extensive scrap processing operation on Ceres property in anticipation of a formal lease execution.' 39 The parties never executed the lease, and when Illinois Scrap
refused to vacate the property, Ceres sued for injunctive relief. The court
130. Id. at 63.
131. 481 N.E.2d 712 (Ill. 1985). The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the trial judge that the

intent of the parties not to be bound was shown by the "manifest weight of the evidence." Thus the
appellate court reversal was improper. Id. at 716.
132. See id. at 715. The language in Dolins stated: "The final contract shall be in form and
substance acceptable to attorneys for buyer and seller." No contract was ever signed. Id.
133. See, eg., Quake Constr., Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 990 (Ill. 1990) (discussed infra at notes 161-205 and accompanying text).
134. 484 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
135. Id. at 1184.
136. See id. at 1185-86. The court also used the familiar "all or nothing" analysis (offer +
counter-offer + modifications = no acceptance) to explain why the precontractual agreements between the parties never formed an enforceable contract. Id. at 1184-85.
137. 500 N.E.2d I (Ill. 1986).
138. Id.
139. See id. Illinois Scrap made rent payments under the oral lease agreement while the parties'
attorneys negotiated the formal lease. Illinois Scrap requested and received permission from Ceres
to begin operation. Ceres' employees even assisted Illinois Scrap in construction of the scrap
processing machinery. Id.
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listed several factors relevant in determining whether the parties intended
to reduce the agreement to writing: whether the agreement is a type usually written; what details the agreement contains; whether a large or
small amount of money is involved; whether a formal writing is required
to fully express the entire agreement; and whether the parties indicated
that a formal written contract would follow at the end of negotiations. 140
The Ceres court applied the last factor to hold that the parties' express
references to formal execution of the lease created a condition precedent,
which overrode any effect of the substantial performance by Illinois
1 41
Scrap.

Illinois courts thus place great emphasis on the condition precedent
doctrine when determining the enforceability of precontractual agreements, even in the face of substantial performance by both parties. One
federal court called this reliance on the condition precedent doctrine a
"legal talisman," which allows Illinois courts to avoid determination of
true intent.1 42 The next section details federal court application of Illinois law to precontractual agreements.
B.

FederalJurisdictions

The federal courts have faced similar problems regarding the en-

forceability of precontractual agreements under Illinois law. Some federal decisions have not been as restrictive as the Illinois cases in framing
the legal issue of whether the parties intended to be bound by a precon-

tractual agreement. Instead, some federal courts make the intent resolu1 43
tion a factual issue, which depends on the surrounding circumstances.
140. Id at 5. These factors originated in W.T. Grant Co. v. Jaeger, 224 Inl. App. 538, 546
(1922), and are the same factors cited in Dolins, 481 N.E.2d at 714. The Dolins court applied the
factors as an objective factual test to determine party intention. LAKE & DRAETrA, supra note 6, at
90 n.24. See also Quake Constr., Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 990, 994 (Ill.
1990)
(citing Ceres factors as "determining whether the parties intended to reduce their agreement to writing") (emphasis added). This test would inquire whether the parties intended the formal writing to
be a condition precedent to any binding effect of a precontractual agreement. The Dolins court
appeared to use the factors to assess overall intent of the parties, not just to assess a condition
precedent to a formal writing.
141. The court also noted that even if a binding agreement existed, enforcement of the oral lease
was barred by the Statute of Frauds. The court remarked that both parties were represented by
counsel and thus should have known that an oral lease agreement would be unenforceable. Ceres,
500 N.E.2d at 7.
142. A/S Apothekemes Laboratorium v. I.M.C. Chem. Group, Inc.,, 678 F. Supp. 193, 195
(N.D. IllI.
1988) [hereinafter Apothekernes 1], aff'd, 873 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1989) [hereinafter
Apothekernes I1].
143. See, eg., Apothekernes I, 678 F. Supp. at 195. Apothekernes I contains a complete discussion of the Illinois decisions from Borg-Warner through Interway. 678 F. Supp. at 196-97. The case
concerned the proposed acquisition of various I.M.C. assets by Apothekernes. The parties executed
a letter setting forth the terms of the transaction, including issues resolved as well as those requiring
further negotiation. The letter made the deal "subject to" the approval of the parties' boards of
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Other federal courts have held that explicit language can create conditions precedent to binding intent.'" The Seventh Circuit recognizes that
Illinois law permits parties to approach agreements in non-binding stages
without fear of being unintentionally bound by an immature precontractual agreement. 145
The federal courts have been more receptive to the obligation of
good faith in negotiation. 146 One court has declared that the Illinois
Supreme Court would recognize the obligation in light of Borg-Warneralthough the same court then chronicles the post-Borg-Warner Illinois
decisions, which are devoid of any concept of good faith in precontractual negotiating.1 47 The Seventh Circuit has clearly limited the good
faith obligation to precontractual agreements that unambiguously show
the parties' intent to be bound.1 48 The Seventh Circuit also has developed an approach to determining ambiguity in precontractual agreements that appears to conflict with some Illinois Appellate Court
decisions.1 49 That split in authority on ambiguity is discussed below.150
C. Ambiguity
The Illinois Appellate Courts are split on whether extrinsic evidence
directors, explicitly reserving unlimited discretion to the directors to accept or reject the deal.
Apothekernes II, 873 F.2d at 156. The trial court (almost apologizing for the result) found that
because of the complexity of the transaction, and considering all the surrounding circumstances of
the negotiations, that the parties had not entered a binding contract for the deal. Apothekernes I, 678
F. Supp. at 198. The trial court also found that the parties had entered a binding agreement to
negotiate in good faith, but that I.M.C. had not breached that duty. Id. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on both counts. Apothekernes II, 873 F.2d at 160.
144. See e.g., Empro Mfg. Co. v. Ball-Co Mfg., Inc., 870 F.2d 423 (7th Cir. 1989) (letter of
intent not a contract; contained language "subject to satisfaction of certain conditions precedent").
Empro reads Interway to make language such as "subject to later agreement" non.binding as a matter of law. But Empro also cautions that "subject to" are not magic words. Id. at 425. See also
Feldman v. Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 850 F.2d 1217, 1219 (7th Cir. 1988) (letter of intent not a contract;
letter stated "this is not a binding agreement" and "rights of the parties shall be set forth in the
definitive agreement"); Runnemede Owners, Inc. v. Crest Mortgage Corp., 861 F.2d 1053 (7th Cir.
1988) (loan commitment latter not a contract; held that parties may make future contract execution
a condition precedent to a binding contract).
145. Empro, 870 F.2d at 426 (citing Dolins, Interway Feldman).
146. See, eg., Apothekernes II, 873 F.2d at 158-60; Evans, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 416 F. Supp.
224 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
147. Apothekernes 1, 678 F. Supp. at 197.
148. See, eg., Feldman, 850 F.2d at 1217. Mere disagreement over negotiated terms is not "bad
faith." Even if a precontractual agreement to negotiate in good faith is binding, the parties are not
thus bound to the ultimate deal, as the plaintiff in Feldman argued. Id. at 1223. Also, an agreement
to negotiate in good faith does not promise that the negotiations will be fruitful. Id. See also Chase
v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 744 F.2d 566, 570 (7th Cir. 1984) (commitment to negotiate in good
faith can be binding if parties intend; but no contract ensues when parties break off negotiations
(dicta)).
149. See Federal Depositors Ins. Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 877 F.2d 614, 621 (7th Cir. 1989).
150. See infra notes 151-60 and accompanying text.
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may be used to determine ambiguity in precontractual agreements.1 51 In
Rakowski v. Lucente,152 the Illinois Supreme Court held that a court
must determine the intent of the parties to an unambiguous agreement
from the "face of the document" without the aid of extrinsic evidence. 153
Rakowski, however, did not hold specifically that extrinsic evidence is
1 54
inadmissible first to show whether the document is ambiguous.
Because the Illinois Appellate Courts have not followed Rakowski
uniformly, 5 5 the Seventh Circuit has expanded determination of
precontractual agreement ambiguity beyond the "four corners" of the
document.15 6 Judge Posner illustrated the concept of "intrinsic" and
"extrinsic" ambiguity, which courts may use in assessing the parties' intent. Intrinsic ambiguity refers to uncertainty within the plain meaning
of the document itself, while extrinsic ambiguity refers to uncertainty of
the document's meaning to those cognizant of the commercial setting. 57
Until the Illinois Supreme Court resolves this conflict, in some courts
extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine if ambiguity exists (and
hence whether extrinsic evidence is thus inadmissible to determine the
meaning of the agreement). 58 This extrinsic ambiguity concept corresponds with the federal courts' willingness to consider all of the surrounding circumstances of negotiation in determining the enforceability
of precontractual agreements, in contrast to considering only the express
language.1 59 While the current law in Illinois regarding precontractual
agreements thus appears "settled,"1 ' ° many divergent undercurrents still
run beneath the surface. Some of these undercurrents are examined in
the following section.
151. See Metalex Corp. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 863 F.2d 1331, 1335 (7th Cir. 1988) (collecting
split Illinois Appellate Court cases; stating that Seventh Circuit interprets "Illinois law [as] allowing
a court to consider extrinsic evidence in determining whether a contract is ambiguous"); see also
Federal Depositors, 877 F.2d at 621 (7th Cir. 1989) (Judge Posner discussing split).
152. 472 N.E.2d 791 (I1 1984).
153. Id. at 794.
154. See Harris Bank Naperville v. Morse Shoe, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1109 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (trial
court memorandum detailing and attempting to reconcile the Illinois and Seventh Circuit decisions
on ambiguity and use of extrinsic evidence to determine parties' intent to be bound); see also
Metalex, 863 F.2d at 1335.
155. Compare United Equitable Ins. Co.v. Reinsurance Co. of Am., 510 N.E.2d 914,918-19 (Ill.
App. Ct.) (rejecting extrinsic evidence), appeal dismissed, 517 N.E.2d 1096 (Il1. 1987) with Zale
Constr. Co. v. Hoffman, 494 N.E.2d 830, 834 (IMI.App. Ct. 1986) (court may consider extrinsic
evidence).
156. Federal Depositors, 877 F.2d at 614, 620-22.
157. See id
158. E. ALLAN FARmswORTH,CoNTRAcTs § 7.12, at 502-07 (1982).
159. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
160. See Quake Constr., Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 990 (Ill.
1990).
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Quake v. American Airlines
1. The Facts

A recent Illinois case involving a precontractual agreement is Quake
Construction,Inc v. American Airlines,Inc.' 61 Quake alleged that American's general contractor, Jones Brothers Construction Corp. ("Jones")
had orally informed it that Jones would award Quake a contract for expansion of certain American maintenance facilities at O'Hare Airport.
Jones requested information about Quake's subcontractors, but Quake
replied that it could not enter agreements with its own subcontractors
without first receiving a signed contract from Jones. Jones instead sent
Quake a "letter of intent" awarding Quake the contract, referencing inter
alia the scope of work, various bid documents, and the lump-sum price
of $1,060,568.162 The letter directed Quake to begin performance almost
immediately
with formal written contract execution to follow
"shortly." 1 63 Quake began preparing to perform by awarding subcontracts, obtaining office space, and hiring additional personnel. The following week, however, Jones abruptly terminated Quake's participation
in the project. The letter of intent stated "[w]e have elected to award the
contract for the subject project to your firm," but also stated "[we] reserve the right to cancel this letter of intent if the parties cannot agree on
a fully executed subcontract."1 64 Based on this cancellation clause, the
trial court dismissed the action. 65 The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that the conflicting language of "award" and "cancel"
indicated factual ambiguity in the parties' intent to be bound, which the
trial court could not decide as a matter of law. 166 The Illinois Supreme
Court affirmed, agreeing that the language was ambiguous, yet limited its
67
holding to the issue that the parties' intent was controlling.
The Quake decisions appear to explore no new ground, because the
Supreme Court specifically limited its holding to confirmation that the
parties' intent was ambiguous. 168 In addition, the court cautioned that
each precontractual agreement case must be decided on its own particu161. 565 N.E.2d 990 (Ill. 1990) [hereinafter Quake I1A.
162. See id at 992.
163. Id. at 992-93.
164. Id
165. Id at 995.
166. See generally Quake Constr., Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 537 N.E.2d 863 (II1.App. Ct.
1989) [hereinafter Quake 1].

167. Quake II, 565 N.E.2d at 1001.
168. Id The Supreme Court also pointed out that it didn't decide the merits of plaintiff's argument that a fully enforceable construction contract existed, preferring to leave that task to the trier
of fact on remand. Id.
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lar set of facts. 169 But a closer examination of the various Quake opinions indicates the mind-set of the Illinois justices when faced with a
precontractual liability question. The extensive dicta in the Quake opinions, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's caveat, 7 0 thus comprises a
judicial treatise on the current state of precontractual liability in Illinois.
2.

The Appellate Dissent

The Illinois Appellate Court followed a rather vanilla "all or nothing" approach in its analysis of the facts.1 7 1 On the other hand, the dissent exhibited some disturbing judicial pronouncements. 172 First, the
dissent decided that the conflict between "award" and "cancel" was not
ambiguous.1 73 The precontractual agreement language in the cases cited,
however, did not include any examples of language authorizing a contractor to proceed with work.17 4 Next, the dissent attempted to find a
condition precedent in the reference to the formal contract to follow
"shortly."' 175 The dissent also claimed that the Jones letter of intent did
not include all the essential terms of a complete agreement.1 76 Finally,
and most disturbingly, the dissent proclaimed that a precontractual
agreement can authorize a subcontractor to proceed with work, while not
169. Id. (citing Borg-Warner, 156 N.E2d at 518). The court here warned that the presence or
absence of particular language will not ensure that a precontractual agreement is not ambiguous.
This warning tends to advise that attempts to generalize about cases involving "intent to be bound"
may not bear fruit. Nevertheless, the following sections of this Note attempt to do this, not to
develop a set of positive catch-all rules, but to illustrate the reasoning which Illinois Appellate and
Supreme Court Justices might apply to similar situations.
170. See supra note 169.
171. See generally Quake I, 537 N.RE2d 863. The court followed the established "intent" routine: completeness; language; ambiguity; condition precedent. The court hung its hat on the "ambiguity" peg. The court remanded because the determination of intent was a factual question, and the
trial court should have admitted parol evidence to resolve the ambiguity, thus dismissal was improper. Id at 867.
172. See Quake I, 537 N.E.2d at 868-71 (McNamara, J., dissenting).
173. Id at 869 (McNamara, J., dissenting) (citing cases where courts held language similar to
the Quake cancellation clause to unambiguously show that the parties did not intend to be bound by
precontractual agreements).
174. See, eg.. Feldman v. Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 850 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1988) (real estate);
Chicago Inv. Corp. v. Dolins, 481 N.E.2d 712 (Ill. 1985) (real estate); Interway, Inc. v. Alagna, 407
N.E.2d 615 (II1.App. Ct. 1980) (stock acquisition); Terracom Dev. Group, Inc. v. Coleman Cable &
Wire Co., 365 N.E.2d 1028 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1977) (real estate); Brunette v. Vulcan Materials Co., 256
N.E.2d 44 (Ill. App. CL) (real estate), appealdenied, 43 M1.2d 397 (1970).
175. Quake 1, 537 N.E.2d at 869-870 (McNamara, J.,
dissenting). But the language in the cases
cited included either express provisions for a future contract, see, eg., Terracom, 365 N.E.2d at
1028, or express disclaimers of binding effect, see, eg., Feldman, 850 F.2d at 1217.
176. Quake 1, 537 N.E.2d at 870 (McNamara, J., dissenting). But the "terms" reserved for
future agreement concerned details of affirmative action requirements and subcontractor performance bonding. Id. at 867. In a S1 million construction contract, such terms can hardly be considered "deal breakers" that a court could not supply. See also infra note 244.
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binding the issuer.1 77 Thus, the dissent condoned the notion that issuers
of precontractual agreements can "have their cake and eat it, too," a

misuse of such agreements decried in the concurring opinion of Supreme

Court Justice Stamos.178 The dissent concluded that enforcement of the
Quake agreement would deprive negotiating parties of all benefit of precedent as guidance in drafting precontractual agreements.179
3.

The Supreme Court Majority Opinion

The Illinois Supreme Court majority in Quake followed much the
same "all or nothing" approach as the court below.'8 0 The court added
an analysis of "factors" that may be considered to determine whether the
parties intended to reduce their agreement to writing."" t The inclusion of
these factors indicated that an Illinois court should examine the entire
context of the negotiation process when determining the parties' intent.18 2 The court dwelled on the cancellation clause, finding its presence
177. Quake 1, 537 N.E.2d at 870 (McNamara, J., dissenting) (citing S.N. Nielsen Co. v. National
Heat & Power Co., 337 N.E.2d 387 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975)). In Nielsen, the appellate court affirmed
trial court judgment in favor of defendant subcontractor finding that letter of intent was not enforceable. Interestingly, the Nielsen court reached a result opposite Quake in a similar factual setting. In
Quake, plaintiff subcontractor sought enforcement of a letter authorizing it to proceed. In Nielsen,
plaintiff general contractor sought enforcement against subcontractor wishing not to proceed. Hence,
Justice McNamara cited Nielsen for the proposition that a letter authorizing subcontractor to proceed can be non-binding. Quake I, 537 N.E.2d at 870 (McNamara, J., dissenting). But the Nielsen
court reached its result because the plaintiff general contractor had accepted defendant subcontractor's low bid knowing that the defendant had made a mistake and could not perform the work for
the bid price. The parties had agreed to the essential terms of the contract via a letter of intent.
When the subcontractor discovered its error and refused to sign the formal contract, the general
contractor attempted to enforce the letter of intent as a binding contract. See generally Nielsen, 337
N.E.2d 387. The inequity of the Nielsen situation readily distinguishes it from Quake and thus
Justice McNamara's citing of Nielsen here appears misplaced. The majority did not adequately
address this important distinction between Quake and Nielsen. See Quake II, 565 N.E.2d at 998-99.
178. Quake II, 565 N.E.2d at 1006 (Stamos, J., specially concurring). This idea of the unilateral
binding effect of precontractual agreements is common in business settings. LAKE & DRAETrA,
supra note 6, at 220 (calling this objective a "hidden agenda" in many precontractual agreements).
179. Quake I, 537 N.E.2d at 869 (McNamara, J., dissenting). Commentators suggest that the
opposite result may actually occur. The cases cited by the dissent appear to offer very definite guidelines. See infra notes 225-39 and accompanying text.
180. See generally Quake II, 565 N.E.2d 990.
181. Id. at 994 (citing Ceres Illinois, Inc. v. Illinois Scrap Processing, Inc., 500 N.E.2d 1, 5 (II.
1986), and Apothekernes 1, 678 F. Supp. 193, 195-96). The factors are: whether the agreement is a
type usually in writing; what details the agreement contains; whether a large or small amount of
money is involved; whether a formal writing is required to fully express the entire agreement;
whether the parties indicated that a formal written contract would follow at the end of negotiations;
at what stage the parties abandoned negotiation; the reasons they abandoned negotiation; the extent
of assurances given by the party now claiming no contract; and the other party's reliance thereon.
Quake II, 565 N.E.2d at 994. See supra notes 137-41, 143 and accompanying text (discussion of
Ceres, and Apothekernes I & I1).
182. The court did not state that a finding of ambiguity is a threshold 'question before the factors
are examined. The court thus appears to disregard its "four-corners" ruling in Rakowski v. Lucente,
472 N.E.2d 791 (Ill. 1984). See supra note 152.

1993]

PRECONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS IN ILLINOIS

ambiguous in itself.18 3 The court decided that the absence of certain
terms also indicated an intent not to be bound.1 84 The court then discussed the appellate court dissent at length, refuting Justice McNamara's
arguments that the Quake letter of intent was unambiguously not binding.1 5 It then distinguished the cases relied on by Jones, using each to
support the ambiguity finding. 186 Finally, the court concluded by instructing the trial court on remand to admit "other" evidence to deter1 87
mine whether the letter of intent was a binding contract.
4. The Special Concurrence
The special concurrence criticized the Supreme Court majority for
so readily finding ambiguity in the letter of intent language."8 8 Justice
Stamos disapproved of using precontractual agreements to "fudge" the
underlying contract issues. 18 9 He quibbled over the exact language of the
183. Quake II, 565 N.E.2d at 997, 999-1001 (stating that the parties would not need to provide
for cancellation if the letter did not have some binding effect). But the court did not conclude that
the parties were bound, only that the cancellation clause was further proof of ambiguity. Id. But see
Inland Real Estate Corp. v. Christoph, 437 N.E.2d 658, 660 (Il. App. Ct. 1981) (clause stated that
parties would be bound only by execution of formal contract, at which time letter of intent is null
and void).
184. Quake II, 565 N.E.2d at 997. Here the court side-stepped the issue of whether the terms
were "deal breakers" and thus avoided the application of Borg-Warner (that contemplation of a
future contract does not render agreed upon terms mere negotiation if all of the otherwise essential
terms are present). The court only said that "certain terms" were absent. Id. The letter did include
terms fixing price, schedule, specifications, drawings, insurance, and affirmative action employment
goals. IM. at 993. The court said that defendant's arguments about essential missing items such as
payment terms, damages, and termination merely supported the ambiguity holding. Id. at 997. The
court never addressed whether these "open terms" could be supplied by a court.
185. See Quake 11, 565 N.E.2d at 996-97.
186. Id. at 997-1001 (analyzing Dolins and Nielsen); id. at 1001-04 (analyzing Interway and
Terracom).
187. Id at 1001. The court followed the "all or nothing" approach to the end. This extensive
analysis of the precedent cases did nothing to expand the inquiry into whether the letter of intent
between the parties could instead be considered a "contract to bargain" (i.e., that the letter of intent
bound the parties to continue to attempt to execute the contemplated formal contract under an
obligation of good faith). For the same reasons that Professor Knapp criticized the Borg-Warner
decision, see supra note 107, the Quake majority steadfastly adhered to the contract/no-contract
dichotomy in a situation where an intermediate regime might have been more appropriate. Justice
Stamos in his special concurrence came closer to expounding this intermediate position. See infra
notes 188-96 and accompanying text.
188. See generally Quake II, 565 N.E.2d at 1005-10 (Stamos, J., specially concurring). Justice
Stamos wrote separately because he felt that any construction of the letter of intent which would
result in an enforceable construction contract was much less plausible than the majority implied. He
also felt that the language of the letter was only marginally ambiguous. See id at 1006 (Stamos, J.,
specially concurring).
189. Id. at 1006 (Stamos, J., specially concurring). Here Justice Stamos accused those who misuse precontractual agreements of "wishing to have their contractual cake and eat it too." Id This
may have been true of Jones, which seemingly wished to authorize Quake to proceed without Jones
incurring any liability for not executing a contract. But Justice Stamos' characterization would
unfairly categorize Quake as an opportunistic subcontractor who jumped the gun before properly
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letter,1 90 and stretched the timing to suggest that the parties could have
executed the final contract before Quake proceeded with any work.191
Then Justice Stamos alluded to a possible crack in Illinois' "all or nothing" armor by suggesting that the letter of intent might have been a
"contract to negotiate." 1 9 2 This theory is supported by one interpretation of the cancellation clause.1 93 Justice Stamos related other possible
purposes of the cancellation clause (e.g., condition precedent, waiver, offer and acceptance, mutuality of obligation, and manifestation of assent)
before deciding that the better view is simply to consider the letter of
intent an unenforceable "agreement to negotiate." 94 Justice Stamos
noted that Quake did not actually perform in reliance on the letter, but
only prepared to perform. 9 5 The special concurrence concluded with a
discussion of business uses for precontractual agreements, warning drafters to use care in avoiding ambiguity about whether the parties intend to
be bound. 196
signing a written contract. Parties to precontractual agreements, however, commonly begin performance in anticipation of the formal contract. See eg., Ball, supra note 96, at 572.
190. Id at 1006 (Stamos, J., specially concurring). Here Justice Starnes differentiated between
the letter's "elected to award" and a true contractual "award," comparing the former to the shopper
who initially decides to buy an item, and the latter to the subsequent purchase. Thus Jones' "election" did not constitute an actual "award" to Quake. Id
191. The letter of intent was dated April 18, 1985, and work was scheduled to begin the week of
April 22, 1985. See id at 992-93. Justice Stamos agreed with Jones' argument that a formal contract could have been fully prepared in the intervening four days, as evidenced by the letter's statement that the contract would be available for Quake's signature "shortly." Id. at 1006 (Stamos, J.,
specially concurring). On the other hand, the letter of intent required Quake to complete the entire
$1 million project by August 15, 1985. Id at 993, 998. Justice Stamos did not address whether this
time frame (less than four months for completion of such a complex construction project) might
have indicated that time was of the essence and thus required Quake to proceed immediately in
advance of signing the formal contract.
192. Id at 1007 (Stamos, J., specially concurring) (citing Knapp's "contract to bargain" and
Farnsworth's "agreement with open terms" and "agreement to negotiate"). This is the first reference in the Quake opinions to any such intermediate regime of precontractual liability. Justice Stamos also cited Evans, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 416 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Ill. 1976), as authority that the
letter of intent obligated the parties to good faith efforts at executing a construction contract including the agreed-upon terms in the letter. Quake II, 565 N.E.2d at 1007 (Stamos, J., specially
concurring).
193. Id. at 1007-08 (Stamos, J., specially concurring). The presence of the clause would then
make more sense because it allows the parties to cancel the negotiations if the final contract is not
executed, rather than allowing the parties to cancel a construction contract that hasn't been executed. Id.
194. See generally id at 1008-09 (Stamos, J., specially concurring).
195. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, Justice Stamos apparently felt that Quake was not as clear-cut
as Horton, where plaintiff subcontractor Horton incurred substantial expenses preparing to perform,
and defendant general contractor Cook's conduct in allowing Horton to proceed manifested Cook's
intent to be bound. See Frank Horton & Co. v. Cook Elec. Co., 356 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 952 (1966); see also supra note 98. But see infra note 201.
196. Quake II, 565 N.E.2d at 1010 (Stamos, J., specially concurring). Justice Stamos likewise
warned recipients of precontractual agreements to beware of the possibility that the instruments are
not enforceable. Id.
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The "Settled" Law

What is the "settled" Illinois law on enforceability of precontractual
agreements as narrated in the various Quake opinions? The lengthy
analyses of "contract or no contract" indicate that the "all or nothing
approach" is alive and well in Illinois. Despite its narration of the "factors" available for analyzing intent,1 97 the Supreme Court majority focused primarily on the express language of the precontractual agreement
while only briefly touching on the surrounding circumstances. For example, the majority only mentioned briefly the Apothekernes factors that
question the circumstances of the negotiations at the time of abandonment and the reasons for abandonment. 198 Thus, the majority did not
deal with the possibility that bad faith was involved.1 99 The majority
also did not address whether the essential terms of a contract were included in the precontractual agreement, 200 or whether Quake's reliance
on the agreement was detrimental. 20 1 The majority thus neatly sidestepped these topics with its limited intent/ambiguity holding.
The Quake courts appear to "pigeon hole" a complex case much the
same as the Borg-Warner court did thirty years earlier. 20 2 A better approach would be for the Illinois courts to recognize the "contract to ne20 3
gotiate" that Justice Stamos mentioned in his special concurrence.
Had Quake pleaded existence of a binding "contract to negotiate," the
trial court instead could have directed its attention to the reason for
Jones' breach of the "contract to negotiate," rather than to the reason
that a full construction contract did not mature. This intermediate position would place greater emphasis on the business expectations of the
parties and would acknowledge that in reality the parties to precontractual agreements intend for some obligations to attach. 204 Illinois courts,
however, have resisted enforcing these intermediate agreements for pol197. See supra note 181.
198. See supra note 181.
199. The Quake cases never address why Jones canceled the award. Knapp maintains that this is
the more important issue. See supra notes 48, 69 and accompanying text.
200. The majority only referred in passing to the missing affirmative action employment guidelines and defendant's argument that other major terms were missing. See Quake II, 565 N.E.2d at
997; see also supra note 184.
201. See, eg., supra note 125 (discussing the Interway court's distinguishing of Borg-Warner,
Itek, and Evans on the basis of the parties' substantial reliance on a precontractual agreement). Here
Quake's reliance likewise appeared substantial. Quake prepared for performance by hiring personnel, acquiring additional office space, and engaging subcontractors. Quake II, 565 N.E.2d at 1005.
202. See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text. Justice was somewhat served in that Quake
avoided outright dismissal. But to recover, Quake must still convince the trial court that a fullblown construction contract with Jones ensued. See supra note 168.
203. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
204. Ball, supra note 96, at 587.
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icy reasons. 20 5 The policy considerations of precontractual agreement
enforcement are discussed in the following section.

III. THE BUSINFSS EFFECr OF ENFORCEABILITY
A.

Policy Considerations

Illinois courts permit parties to an agreement to proceed in stages
without fear that a preliminary agreement will bind them prematurely
and prevent any further disagreement on specifics. 2" 6 The courts recognize this procedure as a "valuable method of doing business, ' 207 and predict that enforcing such precontractual agreements, based on anything
but the clearest objective intent of the parties, would deal a "devastating
blow" to business. 208 Thus, as a policy matter, Illinois courts look skeptically on any claims that precontractual agreements are binding.
Some of the business disadvantages of enforcing precontractual
agreements are outlined in Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp.,209 where the
Seventh Circuit refused to enforce an "agreement in principle." 2 1" Judge
Easterbrook explained that the business practice of entering non-binding
intermediate agreements works to the advantage of all concerned. 211 The
intermediate stages permit more careful planning of complex transactions and allow the parties to fix precisely the stage at which they become
bound. Transactions would be riskier if any rule of law could bind the
parties in the midst of uncertain negotiations. The worst consequence
would be that the parties might become subject to the random determination of a court. Many transactions would become cumbersome while
2 12
some beneficial transactions might be foregone.
The courts have also recognized that the purpose of precontractual
agreements is to provide an initial framework in which the parties can
work toward an ultimate agreement. 21 3 In this sense, the federal district
court in Teachers Insurance& Annuity Ass'n v. Tribune Co. 214 found that
205. See infra notes 213-24 and accompanying text.
206. Empro Mfg. Co. v. Ball-Co Mfg., Inc., 870 F.2d 423, 424-25 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Feldman, 850 F.2d at 1217; Dolins, 481 N.E.2d at 715; and Interway, 407 N.E. 2d at 618).
207. Id- at 426.
208. Id. at 425.
209. 813 F.2d 810 (7th Cir. 1987).
210. See id.
211. Id. at 815. See also Feldman v. Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 850 F.2d 1217, 1221 (7th Cir. 1988).
212. Skycom, 813 F.2d at 815. The transactions would become cumbersome because parties
would avoid committing intermediate steps to paper or would insert exhaustive disclaimers to avoid
binding themselves. Id
213. See, e.g., Feldman, 850 F.2d at 1221; Runnemede Owners, Inc. v. Crest Mortgage Corp.,
861 F.2d 1053, 1056 (7th Cir. 1988).
214. 670 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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a "binding preliminary commitment" to a loan agreement obligated the
parties to negotiate the customary additional terms in good faith.2 15 The
court stated that enforcing such a precontractual agreement serves a
"valuable function in the marketplace." 2 16 The Seventh Circuit in Feldman v. Allegheny International,Inc. 2 17 also recognized this value, finding
that a letter of intent bound the parties to negotiate exclusively with each
other. The underlying business reasons narrated by the Feldman court
concerned the cost of a complex transaction-that the costs may be too
high without assurances that the negotiations will culminate in a contract
2 18
and that potential buyers will reflect this uncertainty in lower bids.
2 19
Thus, a binding precontractual agreement benefits both parties.
The Illinois Supreme Court also noted similar business
concerns in
Quake,220 but declined to change the law of precontractual agreements to
favor the party claiming non-enforceability. 22 1 The appellate court dissent in Quake voiced concerns that lack of precedent would inhibit business users of precontractual agreements, 222 and the special concurrence
223
characterized an enforceable precontractual agreement as a "misuse.1
Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court endorsed only the policy that business
is best served by honoring the negotiating parties' clear, objective
intent.224
215. Id. at 498-99. In Teachers v. Tribune, defendant borrower Tribune Co. reneged on a loan
commitment letter from plaintiff lender Teachers Insurance. Tribune claimed an impasse in negotiation of loan terms. The court said that the existence of these open terms was not fatal, because the
parties had clearly shown an intent to be bound by the "binding preliminary commitment." But the
parties were not bound to a final conclusion; good faith disagreements could still prevent the ultimate agreement. Id. at 496. The court, however, found that Tribune Co. had not negotiated in good
faith (desiring to renege because interest rates had changed unfavorably), and thus breached the loan
commitment letter. Id at 507. The court applied the "factors" analysis of the New York courts to
determine that the parties had intended to be bound. Id. See also supra note 39 and accompanying
text.
216. Teachers v. Tribune, 670 F. Supp. at 499.
217. 850 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1988).
218. Id. at 1221. The seller also has the same incentive to lower the transaction costs, because
many of the seller's costs are also duplicated by dealing with multiple buyers. Id
219. Id The Feldman court held that the defendant had not breached its obligation to negotiate

in good faith, and thus the letter of intent was satisfied. The court rejected the plaintiff's claim that
the letter of intent bound the parties to concluding the deal, and accepted only that it bound them to
negotiate. No breach occurred because the parties had negotiated to a valid impasse; such impasse
or other disagreement does not automatically signify bad faith. Id. at 1223-24. See also supra notes
61-70 and accompanying text.
220. Quake II, 565 N.E.2d 990.
221. Id. at 997-98. Jones had argued that finding letters of intent enforceable would discourage
issuers from including detailed terms, thus inhibiting recording details of the pending transaction
and defeating the purpose of letters of intent. Id.
222. Quake I, 537 N.E.2d at 869 (McNamara, J., dissenting).
223. Quake II, 565 N.E.2d at 1006 (Stamos, J., specially concurring).
224. "Our decision here follows the settled law in Illinois concerning letters of intent: The intent
of the parties is controlling." Id. at 1001.
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The contract law commentators also favor a policy that best honors
the parties' intent, especially because most business persons intend that
precontractual agreements have some binding effect. 22 5 Farnsworth says

that courts fear discouraging negotiation by limiting complete freedom to
negotiate. 226 The courts could actually encourage negotiation and
quicken development of precontractual liability law, however, by more
liberally awarding lost opportunity and reliance damages in precontractual agreement cases. 227 Farnsworth also cautions that court imposition
of a duty of fair dealing might "chill" negotiations or "accelerate" parties
too soon toward the polar regime of "ultimate agreement. ' 22 Thus, the

intermediate agreement regimes would best serve the commercial reality
that most business deals are binding long before execution of the formal

contract documents. 229
Precontractual agreements with some "binding" effect are important to business persons. 230 Judicial inflexibility in not enforcing precontractual agreements will discourage their use, thus not reflecting the
commercial reality of modem business. 2 31 Professor Harvey Temkin
echoes this "commercial reality" theme. 2 32 He believes that the resulting
uncertainty of the "all or nothing" approach actually hinders business
negotiators. 2 33 He also predicts that more certain damage awards for
breaches of "contracts to negotiate" will benefit even potential breachers,
who can thus more accurately predict whether their economic interests
are better suited by breaching or continuing to negotiate. 234 Temkin ad-

vocates enforcement of precontractual agreements with reliance-based
remedies. These remedies will avoid uncertain obligations and the un-

fairness of "all or nothing" awards, thus encouraging more transactions
and ultimately benefitting business shareholders. 2 35 This result will more
225. See generally Farnsworth, supra note 11; Knapp, supra note 2; Temkin, supra note 10.
226. See Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 221; see also Holmes, supra note 10.
227. Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 228.
228. Id. at 242-43.
229. The enforceable regimes of "agreement to negotiate" and "agreement with open terms."
See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
230. See Ball, supra note 96, at 580.
231. Id.
232. Temkin, supra note 10, at 130.
233. Id. at 131 n.24, 147.
234. Id. at 146-47 n.93 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 88-89
(2d ed. 1977)). But see LAKE & DRAETrA, supra note 6,at 170 (arguing that a general imposition of
good faith in a precontractual agreement as a "contract to negotiate" may also create the same type
of judicial uncertainty as decisions dealing with precontractual agreements as complete contracts).
Thus Lake & Draetta feel that recognition of an enforceable intermediate regime with an obligation
of good faith in negotiation will not lead to greater predictability than the "all or nothing" approach.
Id. at 218.
235. Temkin, supra note 10, at 169.
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closely effectuate what the courts' goal should be-honoring the actual
intent and commercial expectations of parties to be bound by precontractual agreements. 236
Professor Knapp maintains that recognition of the precontractual
"contract to bargain" will enhance the quality ofjudicial decision-making and thereby lend more certainty to business decision-making. 237 The
appropriate remedy then would be the only real uncertainty, whereas
without the "contract to bargain" the wronged party usually lacks any
remedy. 238 Knapp disagrees that the "all or nothing" approach offers
more certainty and discounts the inevitable "floodgates" argument
against enforcement of precontractual agreements. 239
Should Illinois courts enforce precontractual agreements? The
Quake decision indicates that a "middle ground" is needed in Illinois.240
The facts strongly suggest that both parties intended to be bound by
Jones' letter of intent to Quake even though open terms remained.2 41 But
in the Supreme Court majority's view, the ambiguity of the cancellation
clause effectively negated that intent. 242 Both of Farnsworth's intermediate regimes could easily apply to the Quake situation: the parties may
have entered an "agreement to negotiate," whereby they were bound to
continue negotiation in good faith; or they may have entered an "agreement with open terms," whereby they were bound to the complete ultimate transaction, with the court supplying the missing terms. In the first
regime, the court could look to the real reason that Jones canceled the
deal and compensate Quake for its reliance expenditures if Jones acted in
bad faith.243 In the second regime, the court could deal with the missing
terms while honoring the parties' intent to be bound to an ultimate agreement. 244 Both parties would be protected against an inequitable "all or
236. Id at 170.
237. See generally Knapp, supra note 2, at 726-28.
238. Id&
239. IdL at 726. Knapp claims that most commercial disputes are settled out of court anyway,
and will continue to be settled there even if courts routinely enforce the "contract to bargain." Id
240. See Quake II, 565 N.E.2d 990; see also infra notes 241-47 and accompanying text.
241. Id. at 996-97.
242. Id
243. Jones could also make an accurate business decision: if its "bad faith" was receiving another
bid lower than Quake's, Jones could decide whether the savings of accepting the lower bid would
offset the cost of breaching (i.e., paying Quake for relying on the canceled letter of intent). The
opposite analysis would take place in a corporate acquisition setting: the defendant seller could decide whether the penalty it would pay to the plaintiff buyer for the "bad faith" of receiving a higher
bid is less than the profits it would realize by sale to the higher bidder. In either case, the transaction
goes to the party that values it more, and the wronged party is compensated for its reliance expenditures and lost opportunities.
244. In a case like Quake, the court would decide whether the missing terms were "deal breakers," or just minor details. The court would then supply the missing terms only if the other essential
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nothing" result: the harshness of finding "no contract" where Quake actually detrimentally relied on the precontractual agreement and Jones
acted in bad faith; or the harshness of finding a "complete contract"
where truly significant open terms remain. Either inequitable result is
possible on remand in Quake and current Illinois law provides no intermediate regime to mitigate these extremes. 245 As the Seventh Circuit
said in Empro,24 6 "[s]o long as Illinois preserves [unenforceable precontractual agreements], court[s] ... must send the disappointed party home

empty-handed." 247
Thus, Illinois law presents many uncertainties and little guidance to
parties negotiating precontractual agreements. The next section details
recommendations to drafters of such agreements in Illinois.
B. Drafting a PrecontractualAgreement
Despite uncertainty over enforceability in Illinois, the use of precontractual agreements in various contexts is a valuable business tool. 248

The usual purpose is to memorialize the settled terms of a transaction
prior to preparation of a formal contract. 249 Drafters of such precontractual agreements can guard against surprise results by precisely defining
the desired effect of the precontractual agreement. 250 The threshold

question, for the drafter as well as the courts, is whether the parties intend to be bound. 251
The parties to a precontractual agreement may intend one of four
possible effects: (1) complete enforceable agreement on the underlying
transaction; (2) agreement creating obligation to negotiate in good faith;
(3) partially enforceable agreement; and (4) unenforceable preliminary
terms were clearly in place. In Quake, the letter of intent appeared to contain the essential terms
necessary to commence performance of the work, either expressly or by reference to other bid documents. Only minor terms such as affirmative action employment goals were missing. See Quake II,
565 N.E.2d at 997. The schedule requirement of immediate preparation for performance by Quake,
combined with Jones' authorization to proceed, reflects the commercial reality common to this type
of precontractual agreement. See LAKE & DRAETTA, supra note 6, at 103-12.
245. Justice Stamos alluded to the "contract to negotiate" in his Quake special concurrence, but
did not state whether the Illinois courts would enforce such an agreement. See Quake II, 565
N.F_2d at 1007 (Stamos, J., specially concurring).
246. Empro Mfg. Co. v. Ball-Co Mfg., Inc., 870 F.2d 423 (7th Cir. 1989).
247. Id. at 426.
248. Id.
249. Thomas L. Bryan, Letters ofIntent, in BUSINESS AcQuismoNs 45 (J. Herz and C. Baller
eds., 1974).
250. See LAKE & DRAETTA, supra note 6, at 217-35; see also Holmes, supra note 10, at 783 (The
best way for drafters to preserve flexibility for the parties to withdraw from negotiations before
becoming bound is to combine express conditions with non-binding-effect language.).
251. LAKE & DRAETA, supra note 6, at 220.
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agreement. 25 2 Drafters of precontractual agreements must first ascertain
the exact intent of the negotiating parties. Drafters can then ensure any
of these possible intended effects by careful wording of the precontractual
253
agreement.
As seen from the Illinois precontractual agreement cases, 254 the intent of the parties is controlling. 255 The precontractual agreement must
therefore explicitly annunciate the objective intent of the parties in language that a court will not consider ambiguous. 256 If the parties intend
the agreement to be a complete enforceable contract, or alternatively to
25 7
be unenforceable, the language should unequivocally state that intent.
Clear, explicit language detailing the exact binding effect of the agreement should suffice.
The precontractual agreement must also clearly indicate any conditions precedent to enforceability. Drafters should not include any reference to a future contract in a precontractual agreement that the parties
intend to be non-binding. 258 Drafters intending binding effect should
likewise be wary of such future references. 2 59 Courts do not consistently
interpret the effect of conditional language. 260 Courts usually honor
clear disclaimers of binding effect, 2 6 1 but courts'regard formal contractual language coupled with vague disclaimers as ambiguous. 262 And
252. Id. at 218-19.

253. Id at 220.
254. See supra notes 103-60 and accompanying text.
255. See, eg. Quake II,565 N.E.2d at 1001.
specially concurring).
256. Id. at 1010 (Stamos, J.,
257. LAKE & DRAErTA,supra note 6,at 220. See also Teachers Ins. & Annuity As'n v. Tribune Co., 670 F Supp. 491, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ('[A] party that does not wish to be bound.. . can
very easily protect itself by not accepting language that indicates a 'firm commitment' or 'binding
agreement.' ").

258. See, eg., Borg-Warner Corp. v. Anchor Coupling Co., 156 N.E.2d 513 (Ill. 1958) (court
held agreement enforceable, despite reference to future contract execution, because agreement was
otherwise complete); see also supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
259. See4 eg., Interway, Inc. v. Alagna, 407 N.E.2d 615 (111. App. Ct. 1980) (held that reference
to future contract made precontractual agreement unenforceable as a matter of law); see also Chicago Inv. Corp. v. Dolins, 481 N.E.2d 712 (Ill. 1985) (held that language "final contract in form
acceptable to attorneys for seller and buyer" showed parties' intent not to be bound); Ebert v. Dr.
Schol's Foot Comfort Shops, 484 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill.App. Ct. 1985) (held that language "upon execution of lessor and lessee" was condition precedent); supra notes 121-33 and accompanying text.
260. See, eg., Interway, 407 N.E.2d 615 ("subject to" language indicated non-binding effect).
But see Empro Mfg. Co. v. Ball-Co Mfg., Inc., 870 F.2d 423, 425 (7th Cir. 1989) (cautioning that
Interway does not make "subject to" language "magic words" dispositive in every case; agreement
may still be enforceable per Borg-Warnerdoctrine); supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
261. See, e.g., Feldman v. Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 850 F.2d 1217, 1219 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding
that precontractual agreement was not enforceable because it stated "this is not a binding agreement
and the obligations and rights of the parties shall be set forth in the definitive agreement executed by
the parties"); see also supra note 144.
262. See, e.g., Quake II, 565 N.E.2d 990 (language of "elected to award" with "reserve the right
to cancel" and contract to follow "shortly" held ambiguous). But see Interway, 407 N.E.2d 615
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drafters may not be able to disclaim implied "good faith" obligations in
certain situations. 26 3 Thus, drafters including conditions precedent in
precontractual agreements must use particular care to avoid inconsistent
judicial interpretation of ambiguous language.
Additional problems occur when parties intend to bind themselves
by an intermediate precontractual agreement that imposes an obligation
to negotiate in good faith. Drafters of such agreements must clearly define the negotiation framework. 264 Defining the framework serves two
purposes: setting the standards of good faith negotiation (usually by
enumerating what would constitute "bad faith"); 265 and providing for
the parties' autonomy (by defining the parties' freedoms and limitations
during negotiation). 26 6 Besides defining the negotiation framework, the
precontractual agreement should specify a remedy for breach, a basis for
fashioning a remedy if practicable, and any agreed compensation for reli2 67
ance expenditures.
Illinois courts have not widely accepted the intermediate agreement
concept. One federal court in Illinois has recognized possible enforcement of a properly defined agreement of this type, 268 and an Illinois
'269
Supreme Court justice has alluded to such a "contract to negotiate.
Thus, because of the tendency of Illinois courts to reject intermediate
(language of "confirm our agreement" and "we have agreed" with "subject to" created no factual
issue of intent; non-binding as matter of law); supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
263. LAKE & DRAETTA, supra note 6, at 170-71. Separate disclaimers of good faith obligations
in otherwise enforceable agreements may not be effective. The obligations of good faith performance
of sales contracts are mandatory under UCC § 1-102(3), and some courts have analogized this principle to apply to other non-sales agreements. Id. But cf Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 242 (noting
judicial tolerance for disclaiming most precontractual liability, including good faith obligations, by
parties to aleatory negotiations).
264. See LAKE & DRAETrA, supra note 6, at 232-35.
265. Examples are: negotiating with third parties; disclosure of confidential information; and
violating the negotiation schedule. "Bad faith" activities which the parties regard as breaching conduct must be explicitly prohibited in the precontractual agreement to avoid court dismissal for indefiniteness. Id at 235.
266. Eg., each party's ability to unilaterally suspend or terminate negotiations at some predetermined point. Id at 235. Farnsworth includes negotiation parameters such as exclusivity, duration,
disclosure, and confidentiality, and also cautions that no drafter should ever leave such definitions of
"good faith" to a court. Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 272-73.
1990) (court stated
267. See, eg., Pearson Bros. Co. v. Pearson, 113 B.R. 469 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
that meeting of the minds existed and that "agreement to agree" had other contractual elements, but
omission of certain terms prevented fashioning a remedy; thus held that agreement was unenforceable); see also LAKE & DRAETTA, supra note 6, at 224-26.
268. See Feldman v. Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 850 F.2d 1217, 1225 n.3 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating in
dicta that cause of action for breach of precontractual agreement obligation to negotiate in good
faith might hold promise, but the agreement at bar was ambiguous as to definition of the scope of
such obligations).
269. Quake II, 565 N.E.2d at 1007 (Stamos, J., specially concurring). See supra notes 192-93
and accompanying text.
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agreements on the "all or nothing"

analysis, 270

enforceable precontrac-

tual agreements of this type must be explicit as to all contractual
elements.
Precontractual agreements authorizing partial performance present
unique drafting problems. Parties wishing to bind themselves and begin
performance in advance of formal contract execution must provide for
resolution of any disputes that might prevent consummation of the formal contract. 27 1 The precontractual agreement must clearly specify the
intent of the parties to be bound.27 2 A suggested format is the "authority
to proceed" contract, which obligates both parties to perform while
awaiting formal contract execution and provides for compensation to the
performing parties. 273 The "authority to proceed" contract would terminate when the parties execute the formal contract, thus protecting both
parties in the interim without the danger that a unilaterally issued "letter
of intent" would be misinterpreted by a court. 2 74 Parties issuing such a
contract could freely negotiate the formal contract without fear of unintended obligations and parties proceeding under such a contract would
be assured of compensation for their efforts. 275 The Quake parties
27 6
needed just such an "authority to proceed" contract.
In Illinois, parties wishing to create binding obligations at an intermediate stage between negotiation and ultimate contract must clearly express their intent to do so. Even under the traditional "all or nothing"
approach, Illinois courts will likely honor clear, mutual intentions expressed without ambiguity. Parties desiring to expand these intermediate
obligations must precisely draft precontractual agreements to include
items such as compensation for partial performance and requirements for
good faith negotiation. Further, drafters must satisfy all traditional contract law requirements such as mutual obligation, consideration, and essential terms, thus allowing courts to find complete agreements and
fashion appropriate remedies for breach. In this manner, drafters of explicit precontractual agreements can ensure that Illinois "all or nothing"
courts will enforce even "unenforceable agreements to agree."
270. See supra notes 116-41 and accompanying text.
271. See LAKE & DRAErrA, supra note 6, at 230-31.
272. See eg., Quake II, 565 N.E.2d at 1001 (holding that ambiguous intent of parties created
factual issue for trial court to decide).
273. See LAKE & DRAiETA, supra note 6, at 231.
274. Id
275. An additional danger for a party issuing a precontractual agreement directing another party
to proceed with work is that the other party's performance in reliance thereon will negate even clear
non-binding intention. Parties wishing to ensure non-binding effect must do so with clear language
and explicit conditions precedent. See Holmes, supra note 10, at 783.
276. See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

The settled law of enforceability of precontractual agreements in Illinois is rooted in the "all or nothing" approach of traditional contract
law. Currently, parties to disputed precontractual agreements must
prove that their objective manifestations showed either an intent to be
bound to a complete contract or an intent that no binding obligations
accrued whatsoever. The Illinois courts have been slow to accept any
"middle ground" regime of precontractual agreement that binds the parties to negotiate toward an ultimate agreement, with or without an obligation of good faith. The Illinois courts have hidden behind a facade of
conditions precedent, ambiguity, and indefiniteness to deny enforcement
of precontractual agreements. The "all or nothing" approach directly
causes this reluctance to enforce intermediate precontractual agreements
in Illinois.
Other jurisdictions, including the federal courts in Illinois, recognize
the intermediate regime of the enforceable "contract to bargain" when
the other traditional contract elements are present. The "contract to bargain" more readily mirrors the commercial reality that certain obligations can accrue at some point during business negotiations.
Enforcement of such precontractual agreements in Illinois, even under
the "all or nothing" approach, will lend some certainty to a most uncertain area of contract law. By enforcing precontractual agreements, Illinois courts will encourage business persons to enter negotiations
knowing that well defined mutual obligations of fair dealing and good
faith will be judicially enforced and that remedies will be available to
parties wronged during negotiation. Business persons who clearly manifest an intent to enter such a regime should feel secure that courts will
honor their intent and uphold their commercial expectations. This security will no doubt foster increased business negotiations, thus increasing the overall level of economic activity in Illinois. The "all or nothing"
approach should not stand in the way.

